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IV 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts shall be provided by statute 1 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that 'The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction , 
over orders judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate junsdiction[]"2 This is an appeal from the final 
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, and although it has original appellate 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the Supreme Court may 
transfer any matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 Whether the Third District Court properly granted a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to 
Dismiss Petitioner Neldon P Johnson s Complaint against Respondent Claudia Laycock? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review of a grant of a motion to dismiss presents questions of law that the Court 
of Appeals review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the [trial] court'" 
Sullivan v Sullivan, 2004 UT App 485, fl 5, 105 P 3d 963 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Foutzv City of S Jordan, 2004 UT 75, H 8, 100 P 3d 1171) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ltah Const, Article VIII, § 5 
Ut Code Ann , § 78-2 2(3)0) (1953, as amended) 
1 
I initiated this matter against Claudia Laycock seeking injunctive relief, not 
monetary damages, for her various rulings and orders entered in my divorce 
proceeding. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
I filed the Complaint against Claudia Laycock on March 1, 2006 in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah, (hereinafter "Rec") p. 1-5. 
The constable served Claudia Laycock on March 6, 2006. See Rec. p. 11. 
Claudia Laycock filed a Motion to Dismiss through her attorney, Brent M. 
Johnson, on March 17, 2006. See Rec. p. 12-18. 
I filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss on March 31, 2006. See Rec. p. 
19-27. 
Claudia Laycock filed a Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss on April 7, 
2006. See Rec. p. 28-31. A Notice to Submit for Decision was also submitted on 
April 7, 2006. See Rec. p. 32. 
On April 10,2006, the matter was re-assigned from the Fourth Judicial District 
Court to the Third Judicial District Court because the Defendant was presently a 
judge of the Fourth District Court. See R. p. 34-35. 
On April 14, 2006, the matter was assigned to the Hon. Robert Hilder. See 
Rec. p. 36. 
On April 19, 2006, the matter was set for oral argument on May 5, 2006. See 
Rec. p. 38. 
2 
Oral arguments were heard on May 5, 2006 wherein Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss was granted. See Rec. p. 41 . 
The district court signed an Order on May 30, 2006 dismissing the complaint 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and stating that Claudia 
Laycock is entitled to judicial immunity. See Rec. p. 42-44. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 28, 2006. See Rec. p. 45-46. 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
See Rec. p. 47-49. 
Facts established in the Record below: 
1. Neldon P. Johnson, Petitioner, is a party to the civil divorce action 
known as Civil No. 004401468 currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah before the Honorable Judge Fred D. Howard. See 
Complaint H 3, Rec. P. 1. 
2. During part of the lawsuit, Judge Claudia Laycock served as the Judge 
assigned to the matter. See Complaint % 4, Rec. P. 1. 
3. During the time Judge Laycock was assigned to the lawsuit, Judge 
Laycock acted outside the jurisdiction of the Court. See Complaint fl 5, Rec. P. 2. 
4. As a direct result of Judge LaycocWs actions acting outside the scope 
of the jurisdiction of the Court, Neldon Johnson has been damaged and his real 
property has been taken. See Complaint fl 6, Rec. P. 2. 
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5 During the lawsuit, Judge Laycock acted in a malicious and prejudicial 
manner, e<ceeding the scope of the Court's jurisdiction See Complaint fl 7, Rec 
P 2 
6 As a direct result of Judge Laycock's actions, Plaintiff has suffered 
damages and his constitutional rights of due process have been violated See 
Complaint fi 8, Rec P 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1 Petitioner Neldon P Johnson stated a claim for relief against Judge 
Claudia Laycock by alleging that Judge Laycock acted outside the scope of the 
Court's jurisdiction in the complaint The notice pleading requirements do not 
require that Mr Johnson plead all of the facts supporting the Complaint The 
decision ot the Third District Court to grant the Motion to Dismiss was incorrect and 
should be reversed 
2 Because the Complaint does not seek any monetary damages against 
Judge Laycock, but only injunctive relief, judicial immunity does not apply in this 
proceeding 
3 If the Complaint lacked sufficient facts under the notice pleading 
requirements, the Court should have given Petitioner the opportunity to submit an 
amended complaint with a more definite statement of the facts An opportunity to 
submit a complaint with a more definite statement of the facts is more appropriate 
than dismissing the case 
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ARGUMENT 
L The Complaint Contained Sufficient Facts to Grant Injunctive 
Relief. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8, pleadings should contain 
a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief All that is required is that the pleadings be sufficient to give fair notice of the 
nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved. Guardian Title Co. v. Mitchell, 54 P.3d 130 (Utah 2002). Under 
the liberal standard of notice pleading, a plaintiff is required "to submit a 'short and 
plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and xa demand for 
judgment for the relief."' Canfield v Lavton City, 2005 UT 60, fl 14, 122 P.3d 622 
(omission in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2)). "The plaintiff must only 
give the defendant fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a 
general indication of the type of litigation involved." jd. Judge Claudia Laycock has 
received fair notice of the nature and basis of the claims I have asserted against her 
and the type of litigation involved in this matter. 
The fundamental purpose of the rules of civil procedure is to "hberaliz[e] both 
pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute " 
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) In Cheney, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the failure of the defendants to plead a subsequent agreement as an 
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affirmative defense was not fatal to the trial court's consideration of that agreement. 
See id. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument to the contrary, the court explained: What 
[a party is] entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. 
When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide for liberality 
to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy, 
but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a reasonable time to meet a new 
issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] so states. 
Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91 (footnote omitted); see also Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. 
Harrison, 70 P.3d 35 (2003) (holding that the failure to plead fraud with particularity 
was not fatal where the defendant had notice and an opportunity to respond); 
Motivated Mqmt. Inf I v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979) (holding, under rule 
54(c)(1), that the plaintiffs complaint was not defective, even though it sought to 
foreclose a lien that on appeal the plaintiff conceded was invalid, because the 
complaint also sought a judgment for money damages against the defendants); PLC 
Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish *N Chips, lnc.502 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972) 
(holding that the trial court properly allowed recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, 
even though the complaint sought relief on the basis of an express contract, 
because the defendant was not "denied a fair opportunity to meet the change in 
theory of recovery"); Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 310 P.2d 517, 519-20 (Utah 
1957) (holding that the trial court properly considered the issue of partnership, 
although it was not formally raised by the pleadings, because both parties presented 
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evidence on the issue at trial); Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005 (Ut. App. 
2001) (holding that the trial court properly ordered the appellant to repay funds 
misappropriated from his children's custodial accounts, even though that issue was 
not raised in the pleadings, because he "had the opportunity to prepare and meet 
the issue1'); Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc.. 930 P.2d 268,275-76 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting argument that the trial court impermissibly granted 
relief on a theory not pleaded where the defendant had notice and an opportunity to 
respond); Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that trial court properly considered an overcharge claim, despite the fact that 
it was not formally raised in the pleadings, because the appellant failed to show it 
was prejudiced by consideration of the claim). Rule 54(c)(1) requires trial courts to 
be liberal in awarding appropriate relief justified by the facts developed at trial, as 
long as the failure to request a particular form of relief does not prejudice a party in 
the preparation or trial of the case. If there is no prejudice, it is necessary only that 
the relief granted be supported by the evidence and be a permissible form of relief 
for the claims litigated. Henderson, 757 P.2d at 472 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
In the complaint I filed against Claudia Laycock, I alleged that Judge Laycock 
acted outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Assuming this allegation is correct, which 
the Court must accept as true, the motion to dismiss should be denied I should be 
given the oppportunity, through the discovery process, to present and obtain 
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evidence that supports the allegations that Judge Laycock acted outside the scope 
of her judicial duties. I need to obtain discovery from Judge Laycock on her rotation 
off of the case and what she said to the new Judge that was rotated onto the case 
It is not within the juridiction of the Court to act as an advocate for or against one of 
the parties before the tribunal, nor is it within the judicial authority of the Court to 
malign or discredit one of the parties to the new judge that has rotated onto the case 
Surely the definition of non-judicial function is broader than that used by the 
district court. Judge Robert K. Hilder stated that a non-judicial function wouid be for 
him to come down off the bench and smack me in the mouth See May 5, 2006 
Hearing Transcript, Rec. P. 54, lines 20-23 pg. 31. While this certainly would qualify 
as a non-judicial function, perhaps worse than being hit in the mouth is to have a 
judge unilaterally, without the request of either party, change a stipulated divorce 
agreement and impose non-statutory requirements that were not part of the 
stipulated agreement. To cloak this action with "judicial function" and therefore 
immunize the judge for her advocacy is to misapply the doctrine of judicial immunity 
I would rather take the punch in the mouth from the Judge than have the Judge 
unilaterally re-write our stipulated divorce decree and take my real property without 
due process All I want is a chance to either amend the complaint or go through the 
discovery process to prove the case that I have alleged. Judicial immunity certainly 
doesn't apply to every action taken from the bench 
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Discovery in the case will show that Judge Laycock acted outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court by drafting a trust deed and trust deed note and requiring 
that I sign the documents drafted by the Court. This is not a judicial act. A judge 
does not have the authority to draft documents and require that parties before the 
Court sign the document drafted by the Judge. Although judges are granted 
immunity from liability for damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities and 
committed within their judicial jurisdiction, drafting agreements in a case pending 
before the judge is not a judicial act and not within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Sanders v. Leavitt, 37 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Utah 2001). Nor does my complaint 
against Judge Laycock seek monetary damages. The only relief requested in my 
complaint against Judge Laycock is a declaratory judgment and restraining order. 
In my divorce case, the parties agreed upon a trust deed and trust deed note. 
The trust deed was recorded. The Court, acting as legal counsel, decided to change 
the trust deed and modify the negotiations of the parties who were both represented 
by counsel. In addition to drafting the newly created trust deed and trust deed note, 
the Court has now imposed upon me not only the form of the trust deed and trust 
deed note but has required that I sign it in ten days. I never agreed to the trust deed 
and trust deed note as drafted by Judge Laycock. My attorney objected to the 
documents during the hearing before Judge Laycock. The Court does not have the 
authority to fill in contract terms that were not included in the divorce decree. If 
there is "any uncertainty or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations 
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to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no 
contract at all." Candland v. Oldrovd, 248 P. 1101,1102 (Utah 1926). The amended 
decree of divorce does not set forth the terms and conditions of the trust deed and 
trust deed note. Because the terms and conditions of this critical part of the decree 
are left for future negotiations, there is not a completed contract and the matter must 
be set aside. "It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features 
of an agree ment is essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be 
enforced if its terms are indefinite." Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 
373 (Utah 1996) (citing Pinqree v. Conf I Group of Utah, inc.,558 P.2d 1317, 1321 
(Utah 1976)); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961)) (additional citations 
omitted); see also Candland v. Oldrovd, 248 P. 1101,1102 (1926) ("So long as there 
is any uncertainty or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be 
had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no 
contract at all."). The court must be able to enforce the contract according to the 
parties' intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually existed, 
there can be no contract to enforce. The Court does not have the authority to 
unilaterally impose the requirements of a judicially created document and require 
that I sign it. 
"A contract may be enforced even though some contract terms may be 
missing or left to be agreed upon, but if the essential terms aire so uncertain that 
there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there 
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is no contract." Acad. Chicago Publishers v. Cheever. 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (III. 
1991) (citations omitted). "Whether or not the [missing term] was essential to the 
contract requires an examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances 
under which the agreement was entered into." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 
P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). Merely satisfying the minimum requirements for the 
statute of frauds does not automatically render all contracts sufficiently definite to be 
enforced by the courts. The terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed 
note are essential terms to the decree of divorce. Because the parties failed to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note, the decree 
must be set aside. Instead of setting the divorce decree aside, Judge Laycock 
drafted the trust deed and trust deed note. 
An unenforceable agreement to agree occurs when parties to a contract fail 
to agree on material terms of the contract "with sufficient definiteness to be 
enforced" Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961)). The present action provides 
an example of what happens when material terms are omitted from an agreement 
and then one of the parties attempts to enforce the agreement. In this case, my ex-
spouse has attempted to enforce the agreement via contempt proceedings, when 
her exclusive remedy under Utah's one-action rule is to proceed against the security 
of the trust deed and trust deed note in the U-check real and personal property. The 
terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note have not been finalized, 
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negotiated or completed by the parties, therefore the amended decree is impossible 
to enforce and should be set aside. 
"[P]arties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or all of a 
contract." Pasker. Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 877 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (quotations and citation omitted). "A valid modification of a contract 
. . . requires xa meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either 
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness.'" Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. 
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 
428 (1961)); see Scott v. Majors, 980 P.2d 214 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999)(noting that to 
"alter, or supplant a contract fairly made," "[t]he same meeting of the minds is 
needed that was necessary to make the contract in the first place" (quotations, 
emphasis, and citation omitted)). ""[Contractual mutual assent requires assent by 
all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the 
terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Ulah 1978); see also 
Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220-22 (Utah 1995) (holding that to form an 
enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of the minds on the essential terms 
of the agreement). 
In my divorce action before Judge Laycock, Commissioner Patton and Judge 
Laycock unilaterally ordered my ex-spouse to draft the terms and conditions of the 
trust deed and trust deed note and then Judge Laycock ordered me to sign the 
documents The unilateral modification of the divorce decree is a contract 
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modification without mutual consent and therefore invalid. It is axiomatic that both 
parties to the agreement must consent to and agree upon the terms and conditions 
of the trust deed and trust deed note. The Court does not have the ability to force 
one party to agree to a modification to a stipulated decree of divorce. 
II. Judicial Immunity Applies to Monetary Damages, Not Injunctive 
Relief 
The Complaint filed against Judge Laycock does not seek monetary damages, 
but only injunctive relief. Judicial Immunity applies to protect those acting within the 
scope of the jurisdiction of the Court. As stated above, Judge Laycock was not 
acting within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court has no authority 
to draft agreements between parties or enter orders that modify the agreement of the 
parties without express statutory authorization. For example, while it may be true 
that a Court has the authority to not accept a stipulated divorce decree that does not 
provide for child support, that was not the case before Judge Laycock. The parties 
had agreed to use a non-recourse trust deed as collateral for monetary payments 
to be paid as party of the property settlement. The Court refused to accept the 
agreement of the parties and unilaterally modified the trust deed. I do not seek 
monetary damages for Judge Laycock's misuse of her judicial authority, but only 
request that the Court prevent the use and application of Judge Laycock's decision 
to go outside the bounds of her jurisdiction. 
III. Amended Complaint More Appropriate than Dismissing the Action 
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Finally, if the district court didn't think there were sufficient facts to support my 
allegation that Judge Laycock acted outside the jurisdiction of the court, then why 
didn't the district court request a more definite statement of facts. Utah is a pleading 
state and therefore only the bare minimum facts are necessary to put the defendant 
on notice regarding a lawsuit. I met those requirements. Judge Hilder decided that 
nothing I know about or can discover would constitute acting outside the scope of 
the Court's jurisdiction. What if Judge Laycock drafted the trust deed after a private 
consultation with the opposing attorney in the case? What if Judge Laycock drafted 
the trust deed to gain some personal favor? What if Judge Laycock used the Court 
proceeding to punish me because of my race, sex or nationality? Granting the 
motion to dismiss prevents me from the right I have to bring forth facts, and discover 
additional facts, to prove my case. The blanket assertion that any act by a Judge 
sitting on the bench is immune from scrutiny promotes judicial impropriety and left 
unchecked, could result in widespread mistrust of the judiciary and the judicial 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Petitioner respectfully requests 
this Court overrule the District Court's decision to dismiss the complaint. 
14 
DATED this / f day of October, 2006. 
PETITIONER 
Neldon P. Johnston, Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage 
prepaid, on the following: 
Brent M. Johnson 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
P.O. Box 14021 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 
on this ffi day of October, 2006. 
Neldon P. J 
Appendix 
1. Complaint 
Neldon P. Johnson. Pro Se 
326 North State Road lc>8 
Salem. Utah 84653 
IN AND FOR THE- FOURTH DISTRICT COURT. PROVO DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Neldon P. Johnson; 
Plaintiff. COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
Claudia Laycock. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Defendant. Civil No. {j{/?0AC£)l£>h^ 
Judge £f&ft 
COMES NOW Neldon P. Johnson, appearing pro se, and hereby complains of Defendant as 
r.„ ] ! „ . . . . , . 
l O I I O V V b . 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Utah County. 
2. Defendant is an individual residing in Utah County. 
3. Plaintiff is a party to the civil divorce action known as Civil No. 004401468 currently 
pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah before the 
Honorable Judge Fred D. Howard ("the Lawsuit"). 
4. During part of the Lawsuit. Judge Claudia Laycock served as the Judge assigned to the 
matter. 
5. During the time that Judge haycock was assigned to the Lawsuit. Judge Laycock acted 
outside thejurisdiction of the Court. 
6. As a direct result of Judge haycock's actions of acting outside the scope of the jurisdiction 
of the Court. Plaintiff has been damaged and his real property has been taken. 
7. During the Lawsuit. Judge Laycock acted in a malicious and prejudicial manner, exceeding 
the scope of the Court's jurisdiction. 
8. As a direct result of Judge Layeock's actions, Plaintiff has suffered damages and his 
constitutional rights of due process have been violated. 
9. All parties hereto are domiciled in Utah County and the injury alleged herein was caused in 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT CLAUDIA LAYCOCK VIOLATED THE DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS OF NELDON P. JOHNSON) 
10. Plaintiff hereby refers to and incorporate each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 
one through 9 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
11. Article 1. Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states that *wNo person shall be deprived of lite, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. 1, § 7. 
12. As a direct result of Judge Laycock's unconstitutional acts. Plaintiff has been deprived of 
property without due process. 
13. During the proceedings in the Lawsuit. Claudia Laycock acted in such a malicious and 
prejudicial manner and outside the scope of thejurisdiction of the Court that she violated the 
due process rights of Ncldon P. Johnson. 
14. Therefore. Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment that the actions of Claudia Laycock during 
the Lawsuit were outside the scope of the Court's jurisdiction and that such actions violated 
the due process rights of Neldon P. Johnson. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INJUNCTIVE RELIEF) 
15. Plaintiff hereby refers to and incorporates each and even allegation set forth in paragraphs 
one through 12 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
16. Plaintiff has incurred substantial damages and the loss of property without his 
constitutionally protected rights of due process and seeks immediate injunctive relief from 
this Court pending the outcome of these proceedings. 
17. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to have all decisions, orders, and rulings made by Judge Claudia 
Laycock in Civil No. 004401468 suspended until the outcome of this proceeding is fully and 
finally determined by competent judges acting in accordance with the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore Johnson prays for the following relief: 
1. For an opportunity to present evidence and testimony before an impartial judge concerning 
the status of Mr. Johnson's real property. 
2. The right to have a fair hearing regarding Mr. Johnson's real property improperly deeded to 
his ex-spouse. 
3. A determination that Claudia Laycock has violated Neldon Johnson's constitutional rights 
of due process and therefore all decisions, orders, opinions or rulings of Claudia Laycock 
should be stricken and the matters heard by an impartial judge pursuant to a fair hearing that 
comports with the pnnciples of due process as guaranteed in the Utah Constitution. 
4 And other amounts that the court may deem just. 
DATED this / day of March, 2006. 
Neldon P. /phnson, Pro Se 
Plaintiffs Address: 
326 North State Road 198 
Salem, Utah 84653 
